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Abstract
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1997: 1_2). Indigenous peoples existed before colonists arrived in their homelands, and yet the
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Indigenous Peoples, Identity, History, and Law:
1be United States and Australian Experience
John R. Wunder

Approximately 350 million people in the world, or roughly 6% of the
world's population are indigenous. Significantly diverse, Native peoples live
in at least 72 countries as nations within nations (Echo-Hawk 1997: 1_2).°
Indigenous peoples existed before colonists arrived in their homelands,
and yet the conquerors have consistently sought to develop legal standards
of indigenous identity. In every instance, identity is related to land rights,
cultural freedoms, and sovereignty issues. What is an indigenous person's
legal identity? Apeople's identity? How is it determined? Who determines
it? Such simple questions have so often generated complex and confusing
answers. It is in oral traditions and texts, both literary and legal, where
reflections of culture and identity are stored and clues to unraveling legal
understanding can be found. However, such analysis is not easy achieved,
since 'determining the indeterminable,'! the process of constructing
indigenous identities through law, almost always occurs within a colonial
legal context without the benefit of indigenous law incorporation. Some
nations, such as the United States, have devoted considerable legal time
and energy seeking to substantiate indigenous identities. Others, such as
Australia, are just beginning this process as the Mabo v Queensland (1992)
decision demonstrates.
Native peoples in today's world, living in non-dominant positions, retain
distinct cultural self-identities. They have different aspirations from the
dominant society as fundamental to indigenous existence is cultural selfdetermination and territorial sovereignty.2 As Danish scholar Jens Dahl has
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noted, identity is seen in indigenous self-determination acts, and the right
to an identity is 'anchored to the right of self-determination' (1996: 17).
Self-determination for indigenous peoples, according to Dahl, involves two
very important concepts: '[S]elf-determination is first of all an act of
cultural identity and secondly a right to be claimed within national and
international law.'
Munganye (1988/89: 76-77) ponders his individual Aboriginal identity, but
it might as well be that of all indigenous peoples. He published the
following poem, 'Black and White,' in a special issue devoted to writings
from Australia in Prairie Schooner, 3 an American literary journal:
What color my soul, heh?
What color you think it?
Black like cockatoo?
See 'im/ - that one there
on old man Gum.
His feathers move in wind
like many ants
on burnt wood.
That cockatoo, he sure be black!
You think that black
like my soul?
What color my soul?
Ask your preacher man.
See what he say.
Is it black like shadow?
Look at shade on ground.
It not so black, I think.
Not black like cockatoo.
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That preacher man!
My soul be white, he say?
Pretty damn silly,
white soul in black body
What so good about white?
You tell me that!
When I sleep, with shut eye,
I dream no color.
Nor black, not white,
not nothing.
You think that dream my soul?
You think my soul no color
like water in billabong?
. Maybe.
Maybe not.

What color an indigenous soul? Ask your lawyer? Your judge? Your
legislator? That's just what has happened and is happening throughout the
world, and especially in the United States.
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Historical Preludes to Defining Native American Identities
In the United States, two forms of indigenous identity are defined by law:
that of individual tribal members and that of collective tribal status. Prior
to conquest, membership in Native American nations was determined by
informal and formal cultural practices within the nations themselves. This
changed after conquest. Since the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934,
individual tribal affiliation has been prescribed by tribal governments with
4
the assistance of federal administrative gUidelines. All tribal governments
define tribal membership through tribal law and interpretation of that law
within tribal bureaucracies and tribal courts.
Collective indigenous recognition as tribal identity in the United States is a
more complex matter. Prior to 1871, recognition at the federal level came
in the treaty-making process. Those Indian nations who signed treaties first
with the sovereign states shortly after the American Revolution and then
with the United States government were recognised as tribal entities. After
the abolition of its own treaty-making powers with indigenous peoples in
1871, the federal government was uncertain as to how to proceed.
(Resolution of 1871; see also Wunder 1985). Congress, the federal courts,
and the Executive branch bureaucracy competed to determine how best to
define indigenous collective identity with most of this competition
occurring during the past thirty years.
Definitions of recognition are very important. They are necessary in order
to qualify for federal programs, special legal opportunities for tribes, and
the reclamation of tribal rights to land and sovereignty. In the United
States, without recognition an Indian nation cannot reach the various levels
of self-determination that are so essential in the struggle for the ultimate
goal of full sovereignty.
Since World War II, Native American nations in the United States have
experienced a number of significant legal events. Beginning in 1946, the
Indian Claims Commission [ICC] was founded. This federal tribunal
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investigated Indian claims related to land confiscations and violations of
treaties, and the ICC made determinations of financial restitution. The
intent of the ICC was to complete, once and for all, investigations of treaty
wrong-doing and to provide funds that would make tribal status no longer
necessary. This, of course, would not be accomplished, but it required the
federal government to recognise tribes in order for them to make claims.
Probably the most important by-product of the Indian Claims Commission
was the discovery of numerous groups of tribes within the United States
who were not officially recognised by the federal government and who did
not have specific treaty relationships with the United States. This occurred
because the enabling legislation creating the ICC made it very easy for any
Indian group, recognised or unrecognised, to file a claim. Once a claim was
filed, it was only a matter of time before the ICC or the courts faced the
issue of whether or not the group was a tribal nation. Ironically, the ICC,
purposely created to assist in the abolition of tribes, instead increased the
number of tribes defined under federal law (Weatherhead 1980; Quinn
1990). Federal recognition of tribal entities continued after the conclusion
of the ICC in 1978 with the establishment of a new bureaucracy in the
Department of Interior, the Branch of Federal Acknowledgment and
Research.
The ICC was created as a part of the termination movement. Many
Americans came to believe that Indians as sovereign nations should not
exist, and so they developed federal programs designed to 'liquidate'
Native American collective identities. Known as 'termination,' federal
actions in the 1950s and 1960s under the watch of Presidents Dwight
Eisenhower and John Kennedy resulted in laws signed abolishing 109 tribes
and bands composed of 11,500 individuals and their loss of over 1.3 million
acres of land. The most well-known of the tribes terminated was the
Menominees of Wisconsin (Wilkinson & Biggs 1977: 151).5
In addition to termination, Congress passed Public Law 280 in 1953 and
adopted the Relocation program for young reservation Indians. Public Law
280 took away criminal and civil jurisdiction on Indian reservations from
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Indian governments and gave it to state governments in six states and
provided for ways other states could assume jurisdiction. This was,
according to several scholars, the most aggressive abolition of Indian
sovereignty rights yet proposed in the United States (Wunder 1994: 107-11;
Goldberg 1975). The Relocation program was designed to take young
Indians from reservations and deposit them in cities far from their
reservations - a twentieth-century form of Indian removal policy. Indian
ghettos emerged in Dallas, Minneapolis, Cleveland, and Los Angeles. It was
a particularly coercive and disruptive policy that placed great pressure on
individual Indian identities as well as state and local welfare agencies
(Fixico 1986: 148-69, 183-5; Harmer 1956; Wunder 1994: 105-7). Thus, the
intersection of Native Americans with federal law through such concepts as
termination, Public Law 280, and relocation programs, caused many Indian
nations to realize that they were in a struggle to retain their basic identity.
Two legal forms of collective indigenous identity emerged in the United
States in the 1970s. They are termed recognition and restoration.
Recognition is the formal means by which the United States officially
acknowledges the existence of a Native American group or tribe. It is
analogous to the official standing foreign nations have with the United
States government. Recognition of Native American nations usually means
that federal programs are extended to the members of the recognised
entity. Recognition can be achieved through an act of Congress, an
executive order, or a judicial determination.

Restoration is the process a tribe must go through in order to be
recognised after it has been terminated. It is a direct response to the
termination acts passed for specific tribes in the 1950s and 1960s. This
designation comes only from Congress. During the 1970s through the
1990s recognition and restoration movements have been very active.
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Recognition and Restoration

Prior to the 1970s recognition was not a controversial concept because it
had rarely been implemented. Congress had not determined what a tribe
was, and the federal courts had not clarified the situation. The Department
of Interior recognised tribes only on ahaphazard case-by-case basis. This all
changed because of the pressures caused by the large number of filings by
Indian groups to the ICC and a 1974 Supreme Court case, Morton v.
Mancari.
In this case, non-Indian employees of the BIA brought a class action against
the Department of Interior over regulations and federal statutes that gave
Indians preference for BIA job openings. It was a direct challenge to a new
Indian self-determination policy being framed in a piecemeal fashion by
then President Richard Nixon and Congress. The high court upheld the
policy of Indian self-determination and declared that 'tribes' was a political,
not a racial, classification. The effect of this decision on recognition issues
was to assure groups of Indians who intermarried with other racial groups
that they were not in danger of haVing their mixed blood status used
against them. Thus, under American law 'tribe' was not synonymous with
race.
Asecond court case caused a rash of interest in recognition legal issues. In
some ways comparable to the Mabo decision which cites this case,joint
Tribal Council ofthe Passamaquoddy Tribe v. Morton (1975) was decided
by the First Circuit Court of Appeals' The Passamaquoddys, or the
Pestemohkatiyek as they call themselves6, have lived in Maine for at least
3,000 years. Their relationship with the United States began with a treaty of
alliance during the American Revolution in 1777. Even so the American
patriots were suspicious of the Passamaquoddys and not very reliable allies.
John Allan, General George Washington's agent on the eastern frontier,
described the Passamaquoddys and their Maliseet relatives in 1783:
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These Indians, particularly the St. John's [MaliseetsJ and Passamaquoddy
are very tenacious of their liberties; deiagacious and subtle people and
may be very dangerous If not attended to; their zeal in the cause and their
virtue in persevering through many difficulties throughout the war with
the attachments and affections the subscriber [Washington 1 has
experienced himself commands his attention as well (Walker Buesing &
Conkling 1980: 44).

Although they fought against the British, the Passamaquoddys were not
invited by the Americans to the Treaty of Paris negotiations. Instead, their
condition after the American Revolution necessitated making a 1794 treaty
with the state of Massachusetts (Maine was then a part of Massachusetts)
wherein the Passamaquoddys ceded most of their St. Croix River basin land
tights in return for two reservations on the Canadian border encompassing
approximately 27,000 acres. For nearly 200 years the Passamaquoddys
watched the state of Maine, in Passamaquoddy the Kewok - a terrible
formless being with an icy heart (Fewkes 1890) - summarily take almost
40% of their reservation lands without compensation or even consultation
(see Brodeur 1982; also Paterson and Roseman 1979; and O'Toole and
Tureen 1971).
In the 1970s the Passamaquoddys decided to sue for their lands because of
an old federal law, the Indian Trade and Intercourse Act of 1790, which
prohibited the sale or taking of Indian lands without a public treaty with
the United States. The Passamaquoddys, like all Aborigines and Torres
Strait Islanders and the Australian federal government, had never signed a
treaty with the United States to cede their land claims. They argued that
the treaty with Massachusetts and the subsequent actions by the state of
Maine were in essence void.
Maine responded. It contended that the Passamaquoddys were not
recognised by the United States as an Indian tribe, and the state pointed to
an 1892 Maine state supreme court decision, State v. Newell, that the
Passamaquoddys were not a tribe. This was in the face of two reservations
and 1300 Passamaquoddys, 800 of whom lived on the reservations.
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The First Circuit judges ruled that the Passamaquoddys were indeed a tribe
and therefore entitled to the trust benefits and protections under the
United States. In reaching this conclusion, the appellate court considered
two issues: first, whether the tribe was racially and culturally in tact, and
second, whether a community of Indians dealt with federal, state, or local
governments over time. In both cases, the Passamaquoddys passed
scrutiny. What this all meant was that the Indian Trade and Intercourse
Act of 1790 prevailed, and that title to most of the land in Maine was
theoretically yet to be extinguished from Maine's Indians (joint Tribal
Council 1975: 376-381).
Congress quickly got into the act. The Passamaquoddys agreed not to press
claims for occupied lands, but they wanted cash and unoccupied lands. The
Maine Indian Claims Settlement Act was passed by Congress in October 10,
1980, and signed by President Jimmy Carter. The statute set up a $27
million trust fund and a land acquisitions fund of over $54 million for the
Passamaquoddys and their neighbors, the Penobscots and the Houlton
Band of Maliseets. Each has subsequently purchased lands in Maine with
the funds. The settlement of the Passamaquoddys opened the door to
other Indian groups, many from New England and the American South, and
all of whom had not signed treaties with the federal government. Most had
signed agreements with states and were not federally recognised. Most, but
not all, were successful in obtaining recognition and claims settlements
(see Schaghticoke Tribe v. Kent School Corp., 423 F Supp 780 (1976);
Mohegan Tribe v. Connecticut, 638 F2d 612 (1980); Narragansett Tribe v.
Southern Rhode Island Land Development Corp., 418 F Supp 798 (1976);
and Wallace 1982).
A different court ordered the Department of Interior to make
administrative law. Mter the Passamaquoddy decision, the Department
received nearly 40 new petitions for recognition. It decided to ignore the
requests. One tribe caught in this delay was the Stillaguamish nation of the
Pacific Northwest, and they went to court. The federal court in the District
of Columbia ordered the Department of the Interior to make a decision on
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the tribe's petition within 30 days (Quinn 1990: 363). This forced the
executive branch to draft guidelines for the determination of recognition.
The Department issued temporary administrative regulations in 1978 and
permanent regulations in 1980. They acknowledged that the large number
of petitions from Native Americans forced them to issue recognition
regulations (U.S., Federal Register 43(June 1, 1978): 23743-46.) In it~
'Procedures for Establishing that an American Indian Group Exists as an
Indian Tribe' (1980), three requirements had to be met by an Indian group
for it to be recognised as a tribe. First, the petitioners needed to be
ethnically and culturally identifiable in a general fashion. There were no
specific racial requirements. This allowed for acculturation and
intermarriage. Second, the group was required to have lived in 'a
substantially continuous tribal existence.' This allowed for a brief lapse in
tribal identification. And third, the group must have acted autonomously
from the colonial era to the present. The Department was also forced to
publish a list of all recognised tribes, and it did so (U.S" Federal Register
45(April 24, 1980): 27828-30).
There were weaknesses in the recognition regulations. All three
requirements had to be met for a tribal group to become a recognised
tribe, and autonomy, one of them, is not easily defined. Pre-industrial
societies that created states limited their activities. While their agendas
were much the same as today, it 'was understood in a minimalist rather
than a maximalist vein; the state did a little and the subjects did the I'C -,t'
(Crone 1989: 47). More often than not, indigenous states are evaluated ;)\
legal institutions in maximalist autonomy terms.
Three other problems have surfaced. Unlike Australia, the regulations only
applied to the continental United States, so Native Hawaiians were left out.
Also significant was the limitation placed on the dynamics of tribal political
development. No 'splinter groups, political factions, communities or
groups of any character which separate from the main body of a tribe
currently acknowledged as being an Indian tribe by the Department .. .'
can gain recognition 'unless it can be clearly established that the group has
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functioned throughout history until the present as an autonomous Indian
tribal entity.' (US Code of Federal Regulations 1980, s 54, 25). This
provision locked tribes into a static political stage of development and did
not allow for the past mistakes of the federal government, such as when
separate tribes, sometimes national enemies, were forced to live on a
common reservation and participate under a government scheme not
sanctioned by one or more of the tribes. One last limitation prevented the
Department of Interior from assisting with the research of an Indian group
seeking recognition.
Although these provisions may seem onerous, they turned out to be more
flexible than those adopted by federal courts making recognition decisions
after 1978. One court that did not accord recognition easily was on the
western coast. The Duwamish, Samish, Snohomish, Snoqualmie, and
Steilacoom tribes signed treaties with the United States in what became the
state of Washington, but because of population movement on and off
reservations that were not monitored, urbanisation in their regions, and
the effects of assimilation, the descendants to the treaty signings were not
recognised when they wished to assert their fishing and hunting rights
against state regulations. In United States v. Washington (1979), the Pacific
Northwest Indians' claims were denied because the federal court
determined none of the tribes were acting as tribes at the time of the law
suit. The court reasoned that the Indians (1) did not live continuously in
separate, distinct and cohesive Indian cultural or political communities; (2)
did not exercise sovereignty over their members or any territory; and (3)
did not maintain organised tribal political structures. Even though cultural
and political fragmentation of these tribes were caused by nineteenthcentury federal assimilation policies and twentieth-century failures of
federal programs to protect the land base, the court tautologically reasoned
its way out of recognition.
Another group who was deterred were the Mashpees of Massachusetts.
Like the Passamaquoddys they sought relief through the courts, but their
timing was not in their best interests. They currently live near Mashpee,
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Massachusetts, and have resided in this region prior to European
migration. At the federal district court level, the Mashpees lost in a jury trial
when the jury was asked to determine if the tribe ever ceased to be a tribe
over the course of approximately 200 years. The answer by the jury was
'yes,' on at least five occasions, and consequently the Mashpees were not
defined as a tribe.
On appeal, the Mashpees sought tribal designation, but the First Circuit
ruled against them. In so doing, the court stated in Mashpee Tribe v. New
Seabury Corp. et al (1979) that there was a four-part test that needed to be
met in order for the Mashpees to be recognised. (1) They were required to
be of the same or similar race; (2) they must have been united in a
community throughout time; (3) they were governed by continuous
leadership and one government; and (4) they inhabited a defined territory.
The Mashpees contended that the united community and governmentleadership requirements were not fair because of federal and state
interference with their tribe, but the court ruled against them on all four
provisions. In both the Pacific Northwest and Massachusetts situations,
courts decided to ignore the new federal regulations and issue their own
opinions that were much more narrow and restrictive. The message
seemed to be that after 1978 if Indian groups denied rights through
recognition sought relief they needed to turn to the executive and
legislative branches rather than the judiciary.
Maurice Kenny, a New York Iroquois, whose relatives fought the Mashpees
before the American Revolution and whose tribe's recognition was not
questioned after the Revolution, could feel the sense of threat to his
indigenous identity in his poem, 'They Tell Me I am Lost' (1991: 68-70).
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my feet are elms, roots in the earth
my heart is the hawk
my thought the arrow that rides
the wind across the valley
my spirit eats with eagles on the mountain crag
and clashes with the thunder
the grass is the breath of my flesh
and the deer is the bone of my child
my toes dance on the drum
in the light of the eyes of the old turtle
my chant is the wind
my chant is the muskrat
my chant is the seed
my chant is the tadpole
my chant is the grandfather
and his many grandchildren

although I hide in the thick forest
or the deep pool of the slow river
though I hide in a shack, a prison
though I hide in a word, a law
though I hide in a glass of beer
or high on steel girders over the City
or in the slums of that city
though I hide in a mallard feather
or the petals of the milkwort
or a story told by my father
though there are eyes that do not see me
and ears that do not hear my drum
or hands that do not feel my wind
and tongues which do not taste my blood..
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I am the shadow on the field

the rain on the rock
the snow on the limb
the footprint on the water
the vetch on the grave
I am the sweat on the boy
the smile on the woman
the pain on the man
I am the sun and the moon

the light and the dark
I am the shadow on the field.
I am the string,

the bow and the arrow.

Restoration also required executive and legislative attention, and its
evolution constructively ended termination without Congress having to be
placed on record as having made a fundamental error. Tribes terminated
were de-recognised in their individual termination acts, and they were
prevented from applying for recognition by the 1980 Department of
Interior recognition regulations (U.S., 'Procedures for Establishing an
Indian Tribe,' Section 54.7(g), 202; Walch 1983: 1188-89). Termination did
not necessarily mean, however, the loss of treaty rights. The United States
Supreme Court in Menominee Tribe of Indians v. United States (1968)
ruled that the Menominees still had their treaty fishing and hunting rights
7
even though they had been terminated.
The first tribe terminated, the Menominees of Wisconsin in 1954, was also
the first restored in 1973 .(U.S., Menominee Restoration Act, Statutes at
Large 87(December 22, 1973): 770-73). Termination was extremely
destructive to the Menominees. They lost vast amounts of land, trust funds,
health care, employment, and education benefits (Herzberg 1978: 170-86).
Congress and the President attempted to stop the damage of de-
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recognition on the Menominees with the adoption in December 1973 of
the Menominee Restoration Act (Oestreich 1972: 266-70).
The act's language was blunt. It specifically repealed the Menominee
Termination Act of 1954. It emphasised that no treaty rights were altered,
including fishing and hunting rights. The United States Supreme Coun had
already assured the Menominees of this, but Congress reinforced the
guarantee. AMenominee Restoration Committee was placed in charge of
the Menominees until their tribal government could be reactivated, and the
membership roll, previously closed, reopened. The Menominee
Restoration Act recognised the Menominees as a tribe once again, and it
returned to the Menominees a number of former rights they had lost,
although the act did not provide for the return of lost reservation lands or
reimburse the tribe for its lost trust funds (U.S., Menominee Restoration
Act: 770-73).
After the Menominee Restoration Act was passed, Congress adopted six
criteria other terminated tribes needed to meet in order to successfully
regain recognition. All six had to be met for a tribe to be restored.
First, terminated tribal members or their ancestors needed to gather in an
identifiable community; and second, the community must be located near
the former reservation. To satisfy these requirements, a tribe essentially
demonstrated its tremendous resistance to termination. Third, a selfgoverning organisation needs to be functioning for the tribe; and founh,
the tribe had to demonstrate that its language and culture were being
practiced. Tribes wanting to qualify for these two criteria set up committees
and held powwows. They reinforced the education of their young in the
ways of the tribe. Tribes were essentially made to be in a preparatory stage
to assume tribal status by conforming to these two criteria. Fifth,
restoration could be granted if tribes proved their socio-economic
conditions deteriorated after termination, and sixth, tribes had to show
they were poorer than their non-Indian rural neighbors.
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These last two criteria were simply the ratification of the obvious. Even so,
they were the most expensive of the criteria to prove. Consultants had to
be hired by the terminated tribes to survey their members to obtain the
information needed. As in the recognition process and with termination
itself, the BIA refused to help the terminated tribes. No financial assistance
was made available (Knoche 1990: 89).
With the restoration criteria clearly articulated, terminated tribes started at
once to regain their rights and recognition. Most of the 109 tribes
previously terminated have been restored. Each restoration has been
unique and has required a specific act ofCongress (Knoche 1990: 79-82, 989).

Comparative Collective Identity Regulations
The story of how the United States developed recognition and restoration
procedures is a complex one that is not easily reconstructed. Nevertheless,
we can discern some trends by comparing the requirements for official
identification of indigenous nations by the executive, legislative, and
judicial branches of the federal government.
From Table I, six categories emerge. Three involve racial, cultural, and
temporal continuity. Some legalists insist that the members of a tribe have
similar racial characteristics. This is a particularly difficult standard to meet
for those tribes in the eastern United States and those tribes located in or
near urban areas where racial intermarriage has occurred over time. It flies
in the face of the American immigrant tradition.
Similarly, legalists believe that a cohesive cultural continuity is essential for
recognition. While this is not often clearly defined, cultural continuity in
the United States is generally described by looking at language and social
practices that are distinctive.
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An indigenous group wishing to achieve a sanctioned identity in the United
States requires proof that the nation has existed continuously over time.
Temporal continuity is applied to culture, community, and governance.
Some legalists have strict concerns about a tribe's failure to retain their
culture or community or political leadership since European and African
contact, even though for over a two hundred-year period significant
outside interference has occurred with tribal abilities to retain continuous
relationships.

Three other traits involve geo-political issues. Indigenous peoples are to be
residing in identifiable communities. They are to be governed by traditional
leadership and exhibit some autonomy. They are to maintain political
structures, and they are to inhabit a traditionally defined territory. All of
these requirements are very difficult to meet because of previous federal
policies that redefined Native homelands and political structures through
warfare, Indian removal, assimilation, land confiscation, lack of treaty
enforcement, imposed governments, and termination, among others.
However, if a tribe has managed to persevere against all odds and still
retain a community, political structures, and a sense of a defined territory,
it can meet these recognition standards.
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Table I
Legal Standards for the Recognition and Restoration of
Indigenous Collective Identities in the United States
Required Identification Traits

Legal Documents

Race Culture Time Com mY Govt

TerrY

1974
Restoration Congressional Requirements
X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

1975
Passamaquoddy Decision
X

1979
Mashpee Decision
X

1979
Washington Decision
X

1980
Executive Recognition Regulations
X
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It is important to note that the frequent considerations of legal identity for
Native Americans during the 1970s did not occur in a historical vacuum but
at a time of significant Native American legal action, at the federal, state,
and tribal levels. One of the most important events involved the settlement
of land claims by the non-treaty indigenous peoples of Alaska through the
Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act of 1971 (U.S., Statutes at Large 92
(December 18, 1971): 688-715). This statute overcame the disastrous
Supreme Court decision of Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States (1955)
which held that Indians without treaties were not entitled to the
protections of the Fifth Amendment that prevented the taking of land
without just compensation (Wunder 1985: 115-8). The decade concluded
with the passage of the American Indian Religious Freedom Act of 1978
(U.S., Statutes at Large 92 (August 11, 1978): 469-70) and the Indian Child
Welfare Act of 1978 (U.S., Statutes at Large 92 (November 8, 1978): 306978).
Note also the evolution of policy. Racial requirements were made by only
two appellate court decisions whose judges did not feel bound by the U.S.
Supreme Court's Morton v. Mancari (1974) decision that ruled out racial
classifications for indigenous Americans. The Passamaquoddy decision
required the tribe to be racially and culturally in tact, but that was an
inconsequential requirement given that the Passamaquoddys had lived on
their isolated northern Maine reservations in their traditional homelands
for centuries. Only in Mashpee did the court use a requirement of a same
or similar race for judgment, and most today believe that the Mashpee
decision was an anomaly, in other words, bad law. The Mashpees had
intermarried with African Americans and European Americans for several
hundred years.
By 1980, with the adoption of federal recognition regulations, the

categories had been made more flexible. One needed to be culturally
identifiable which could be interpreted in a variety of ways, have a
substantially continuous tribal existence thereby allowing for limited
breaks in continuity, and act autonomously since the beginning of the
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British colonial period maintaining some aspects of sovereignty. While
these regulations made for a more rational use of historical evidence in
recognition determinations, it also allowed for greater flexibility of
interpretation and consequently the political nature of subsequent
presidential administrations has inevitably had an impact.

Mabo v. Queensland (1992): International Comparative
Perspectives
Subsequent to the announcement of the Australia High Court's most
important Aboriginal land claims case decision, Mabo v. Queensland (No.
2), a popular Australian rock group named Midnight Oil released a
successful album, Diesel and Dust, dedicated to the recognition of
Aboriginal land rights (1988). The lyrics of one of those songs, 'Warakurna,'
set a tone for the Mabo decision and subsequent Australian federal
legislation and court actions:
There is enough for everyone
in Redfern as there is in Alice.
This is not the Buckingham Palace.
This is the crown land,
this is the brown land,
this is not our land.
Some folks live in water tanks;
some folks live in red brick flats.
There is enough, the law is carved in granite.
It's been shaped by wind and rain.
White law could be wrong,
black law must be strong.
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Warakurna, cars will roll.
Don't drink by the water hole.
Court fines on the shopfront mall.
Beat the grog and save your soul.
Some people laugh, some never learn;
this land must change or land must burn.
Some people sleep, some people yearn;
this land must change or land will bum
Diesel and dust is what we breathe.
This land don't change, this land must lie.
Some people leave, always return;
this land must change or land must burn.
The Mabo case has been compared to Worcester v, Georgia (1832) and
Cherokee Nation v. State of Georgia (1831) in American legal history by
legal historians who perceive the cases showing how the United States and
Australia sought to consider the place of indigenous populations within
their legal structures. Mabo involves the Meriam people's attempt to gain
title to lands in their ancient homelands on the Murray Islands. While on
the surface this dispute appears to be one involving land claims, it in many
ways yet to be considered by legal scholars is basically a question of
recognition and collective identity.
The High Court of Australia ruled that the Meriam people did indeed have
rights to the Murray Islands against the world with the exception of lands
leased to the Australian Board of Missions and the Australian federal
government (Mabo 1992: 80). In the process of reaching this conclusion,
the Court sought to explore common law aspects of land ownership which
required an assessment of recognition concepts.
The Meriam people, the Court found, occupied the Murray Islands before
European contact and have continuously resided there to the present.
There has been no permanent immigration population of non-Meriams to
the islands. As a question of fact, the Court concluded that the Meriam
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people retain a 'strong sense of affiliation' with their past relatives and past
culture, defined as related to 'laws and customs,' and most importantly
with their homelands (Mabo 1992: 62).8 Thus, for an Aboriginal nation to
have standing to assert land rights under Australian law, it must remain an
identifiable community practicing its traditional laws and customs and be in
its 'home country' (Mabo 1992: 71).
Several aspects are striking in their contrast to American jurisprudence on
these issues. First, there is significant attention to the idea that indigenous
peoples must continue to live under their own laws and, in this particular
instance their land law takes precedence. Crucial to collective identity is the
usage of traditional laws to settle disputes. American courts and legislatures
have not considered ties to the land as important requirements for
recognition. 9 When culture is discussed, culture is perceived by American
definitions in a broader social context rather than a political and legal
context.
Second, although little attention is given to individual indigenous identity
by Australia's High Court, it does define who may be considered Aboriginal
in order to establish who has standing to bring a suit for land claims.
'Membership of the Indigenous people', states the Court, 'depends on
biological descent from the Indigenous people and on mutual recognition
of a particular person's membership by that person and by the elders or
other persons enjoying traditional authority among those people' (Mabo
1992: 77).10 Race and migration are understated aspects of this definition.
Biological descent allows for racial and cultural intermarriage, but leaving
one's people may mean that elders no longer recognise membership and
perhaps more importantly a biological descendent may have forfeited
recognition of Aborigine traditional authority. This Australian individual
identity definition is Significantly different from American requirements of
tribal lists, blood quantum determinations, tribal government laws, and
scrutiny of membership by non-Indian courts and agencies. To vest the
power of identity in a people's elders is unheard of in the United States
unless a tribe traditionally and informally consults with tribal elders. 11
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Third, the High Court articulates a 'skeleton of principle' to be binding in
cases involving Aboriginal law (Mabo 1992: 65). What is meant is that 'no
case can command unquestioning adherence if the rule it expresses
seriously offends the values of justice and human rights (especially equality
before the law) which are aspirations of the contemporary Australian legal
system.' (Mabo 1992: 65) Judicial notice is taken by the High Court of its
common law and British Commonwealth past. 'Although our law is a
prisoner of its history', reflects the Court, 'it is not now bound by decisions
of courts in the hierarchy of an empire' (Mabo 1992: 64). This is a
significant admission. It is an admission long overdue in American courts
and legislatures. In part it has not occurred in American courts because
common law traditions have been so modified for so long that they have
been rendered in most instances unrecognisable. There is no specific
commitment in American jurisprudence outside of certain constitutional
rights to the 'values of justice and human rights' in disputes involving
indigenous populations.
The Australian High Court does, however, cite two United States Indian law
cases in building a case for recognising the Meriam people and their land
claims and how sovereignty provides for Aboriginal land ownership upon
recognition. First listed as authority is the Passamaquoddy case, previously
discussed as a watershed dispute in the determination of indigenous
collective identity under American law. Australia's High Court states that
'Sovereignty carries the power to create and to extinguish private rights
and interest in land within the Sovereign's territory' (Mabo 1992: 65). Here
the Court refers to note 6 in Passamaquoddy, a legal aside considering the
concept of 'right to occupancy', as giving American Indian nations fee
simple title to their lands. This concept gives legal credence to treaties and
provides non-treaty indigenous nations with legal standing. It states,
'Indian title, also called' right to occupancy', refers to the Indian tribes'
aboriginal title to land which predates the establishment of the United
States. The right to extinguish Indian title is an attribute of sovereignty
which no state [referring to the individual American states], but only the
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United States [the federal government] can exercise; the Nonintercourse
Act [the federal statute that restricts land cessions to treaty-making by
Indians with the federal government only rather than with the states]
giving statutory recognition to that fact.'
Australia's High Court next invokes Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States.
The Court notes that 'The sovereign power mayor may not be exercised
with solicitude for the welfare of Indigenous inhabitants but, in the case of
common law countries, the courts cannot review the merits, as distinct
from legality, of the exercise of sovereign power' (Mabo 1992: 72). In fact,
the Tee-Hit- Ton decision turns on a particularly narrow interpretation of
the Fifth Amendment to the U.S Constitution in preventing an Alaska
Indian tribe from stopping the cutting of trees on land they claim as their
homelands, and the Supreme Court reviewed the merits of the case.
Although perhaps more analogous to the Australian situation, given the
lack of treaties with Native Alaskans as well as with Aborigines, this case is
not good law. In essence, it has been overruled by the Alaska Native Claims
Settlement Act.
Of significance, however, is that the Australian High Court follows this
discussion with a disclaimer, stating 'However, under a constitutional law of
this country, the legality (and hence the validity) of an exercise of a
sovereign power depends on the authority vested in the organ of
government purporting to exercise its municipal constitutional law [and]
determines the scope of authority to exercise a sovereign power over
matters governed by municipal law, including rights and interests in land'
(Mabo 1992: 72-73). The Court is basically stating that the right to
recognise Aboriginal land claims is not vested in any other power than
themselves unless pre-empted by parliamentary power, and it can do so
based upon its 'skeleton of principle.' In the United States its highest court
has abrogated this responsibility to Congress through the Lone Wolf v.
Hitchcock (1903) decision nearly a century ago. Nevertheless, Australia's
High Court has defined who and how such indigenous land actions may be
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naintained, and in this process it provided for rudimentary forms of
'ecognition characteristics.
[t has gone so far as to provide Menominee Tribe-like assurances. 'Native
title', according to the High Court, 'was not extinguished by the creation of
reserves nor by the mere appointment of ' trustees' to control a reserve
where no grant of title was made' (Mabo 1992: 74). When the Menominees
in the United States sought to preserve their treaty rights even though they
had been terminated, the U.S. Supreme Court held that those rights
superseded even termination legislation.
How then does the Mabo decision compare to American collective identity
law? From Table I the Mabo decision can be inserted into all six categories.
Requirements of racial, cultural, and temporal continuity are made in
differing ways. Biological descent is in essence left with each Aboriginal
nation. Cultural identity is stressed primarily in terms of tribal law and
environmental relationships to the land. Time is viewed as important in
terms of territory in that occupancy of traditional homelands is a
mandatory aspect of recognition. Political structures are important because
of the need to retain traditional law ways, but those structures are not
mandated or defined beyond their relationships to culture. In essence,
Australia's first attempt at recognition law is one that differs significantly
from American attempts.

Conclusion

Indigen9us identity, law, and history have a sordid past. It is as well to
reiterate that each and every concept and issue raised here must be
considered within colonial relationships. Post-colonial ideologies, so
prevalent today in literary, historical, anthropological, and sociological
writings, are simply not applicable. There is no such thing as a post-colonial

105

106

Wunder

society in terms of indigenous legal identity external to indigenous
peoples.
Since contact with non-Native nations, indigenous peoples have been in
various degrees of colonial status at the same time the leadership of
colonial societies have been in various forms of historical denial. Neither
group can move beyond these colonial relationships until historical
relationships have been understood and indigenous peoples achieve
12
political and legal self-determination. Robert K. Hitchcock explains the
importance of one of these dual concepts in today's world. Reclaiming
history 'is one of the most significant social movements world-wide in the
late 20th century.' Writes Hitchcock, 'Everywhere, indigenous peoples are
in the process of rediscovering aspects of themselves that had long been
suppressed (1996: 84). Recapturing histories is not simply a question of
reviving old ethnic identities; it is also about acknowledging the birth of
new ones... .' Recognition of collective indigenous identities must include
the old and the new to be true recognitions.
Within the context of the approaching twenty-first century, the historically
harsh relationships of Native peoples and colonial societies are being
mitigated by self-determination experiments in the United States, Australia,
Canada, South Mrica, New Zealand, and other world nations, but the
colonial setting is still firm. Aprimary building block in that colonial setting,
Native peoples argue, is flexible recognition law and the strengthening of
collective indigenous identities so that greater indigenous control of their
own governments and homelands can be ultimately attained (DePalma
1996).
Notes

I am particularly indebted to my colleagues at the University of NebraskaLincoln: David Wishart, Professor of Geography; Robert Hitchcock, Chair and
Professor of Anthropology; and George Wolf, Associate Professor of English,
for their interest in this project and for their very helpful references.
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I am indebted to Lawrence Rosen (1989) for this phrase, which he uses to
describe law and legal systems that '... must cope with defining as well as
discovering facts.' 'Defining' in terms of colonial legal systems and
indigenous identities requires the finding of facts previously ignored and a
thorough sifting through those facts, something colonial legal systems are
completely unprepared to handle.
Echo-Hawk 1997: 6-9. See also Corbett 1996. Robert K. Hitchcock
(unpublished) has noted that 'Recent estimates suggest that over 40% of the
people around the world do not enjoy basic civil liberties and human rights
today. 1.2 billion people are poverty-stricken, and over 100 million people
are enslaved. Indigenous peoples comprise one segment of the world's
population that faces conditions that are especially stark. . .. [Indigenous
peoples have suffered abuses that in many cases are more serious than those
perpetrated upon most if not all other groups.] Some analysts argue that
indigenous peoples are probably the single most disadvantaged set of
populations in the world today.'
These conditions exist in the richest and poorest of world nations. For
example, in Russia and Australia recent discussions have highlighted the
poverty of remote Aboriginal communities in central Australia and the
destruction of indigenous communities to the pOint of the near extinction of
the Native peoples of Kamchatka (Farnsworth 1997, Specter 1997).
While Munganye was asserting his identity, Australia was oddly treated to
several revelations of persons who were falsely asserting Aboriginal identities.
There was the case of Wanda Koolmatrie, author of a supposedly Aboriginal
autobiography, My Own Sweet Time, who turned out to really be Leon
Carmen, a 47-year old white man living in Sydney. Then there was the awardwinning supposedly Aboriginal painter Eddie Burrup from Kimberley who
was really Elizabeth Durack, an 82-year-old white woman of Irish descent.
The acting-director of the Kimberley Aboriginal Law and Cultural Center,
Wayne Bergman, called the Durack revelation the 'ultimate act of
colonization': Omaha World-Herald, March 9, 1997, 25A; March 14, 1997, p.

6.
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U.S., Statutes at Large 48 Gune 18, 1934): 984-88 [Indian Reorganization Act
or Wheeler-Howard Act]. For discussions on historical dimensions of this
law, see Wunder 1994; Kelly 1975; Philp 1977.
Tribal governments were encouraged to define Indian membership via
bloodlines, usually at 1/8 or higher quantum. Native nations who retained
traditional governments, such as those of the Pueblos and Navajos, also
adopted identity rules. The passage of the Indian Bill of Rights in 1968 was
initially interpreted to undermine these definitions by holding them up
against constitutional limits on the power ofgovernment over individuals. But
the U.S. Supreme Court in Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez (1978) ended
such erosions of tribal sovereignty over individual tribal membership identity.
See Civil Rights Act of 1968 [also known as the Indian Bill ofRights], Titles II
through VII, U.S., Statutes at Large 82 (April 11, 1968): 73-92; and Wunder
1994: 124-46.
See also Nancy Oestreich Lurie (1972); Susan Hood(1972); Larry W. Burt
(1986); and Donald 1. Fixico (1986).
This name literally means 'those of the place where pollock are plentiful.':
Erickson 1978: 135.
In general, state courts tried to denied tribes treaty rights while federal courts
followed the lead of Menominee Tribe.
In Australian literature, the themes of ties to the land and self-respect are
strong aspects ofAboriginal identities. See Thea Astley 1993: 57-69.
American legalists have determined the traditional homelands of various
Native nations through the work of the Indian Claims Commission. This
contrasts with Australia's efforts to set Aboriginal clan boundaries. The work
has just begun. See Davis and Prescott 1992; and Davis 1994.
10

According to Corbett 1996: 56-57, until Mabo there were 117 different
definitions of an Aboriginal person in federal and state legislation
Canada, unlike Australia, has rigidly codified indigenous identities to be
reflected in treaties and the Indian Act of 1876. Olive Patricia Dickason,
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Canadian legal and indigenous historian, has summarized the Canadian
situation: 'The legal position of Amerindians in Canada is determined not
only by the Indian Act but also by the constitution and the treaties. Despite
the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, which in theory overrides all
other statutes, the Indian Act continues to define Amerindian rights even as
it reflects so little faith in the Indians'. Far from viewing Amerindians as
equals, its goals of protection and assimilation have led to an emphasis on
control rather than development' (Dickason 1992: 400).
11

12

Identity requirements for the Saami in northern Russia, Finland, Sweden, and
Norway, are much more stringent. One must be able to prove descent to the
official Saami Registration Roll, speak a Saami language, and be recognized by
the Saami community. There are dual colonial and indigenous government
requirements (Corbett 1996: 53).
Current issues for indigenous peoples within colonial constructs as reported
in the American press include: assertions by Australian politicians such as
Pauline Hanson that Aborigines are cannibals; the revelation by the 'Stolen
Generations Report' that Aboriginal children were being taken from their
parents and placed in white families or orphanages up to the 1970s; the
marketing of Saamis in Finland on playing cards as mushroom eating drug
addicts; and the demeaning of Maori culture in New Zealand through the
manufacture of wax candle figUrines of Maori chiefs with the wick protruding
through the head. 'Cannibalism Claim Outrages Australian Aborigines,'
Omaha (Nebraska) World-Herald, April 23, 1997; V. Joshi, 'Australian
lawmaker likened to Hitler,' Lincoln (Nebraska) Journal-Star, May 9, 1997; J.
George [Nunatsiaq News Correspondent], 'Sami Youth Protest Exploitation
by Tourism Hucksters,' native-l@tamvml.tamu.edu, December 13, 1996;
'Report: Forced adoption was' genocide',' Lincoln (Nebraska) Journal·Star,
May 21, 1997; C. Farnsworth, 'Facing Pain of Aborigines Wrested From
Families, Many Australians Shrug,' New York Times, June 8, 1997.
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